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ABSTRACT 
Reserve P-3 squadrons are directed to maintain a complement of six aircraft in 
their inventory. This number was determined through the application of a concept known 
as the crew seat ratio (CSR). While implementation of the CSR provides an accurate 
means of determining what is required operationally, further application results in 
excessive aircraft assignments, stressing maintenance capacities. The CSR assumes all 
aircrew will attain scheduled proficiency and readiness requirements. However, only 
deploying aircrew are expected to pursue readiness requirements throughout the FRTP. 
Therefore, applying a consistent ratio to all aircrew results in assigning more aircraft 
than what is required. The assignment of six aircraft can be burdensome, as 
reserve maintenance departments are at a disadvantage and not adequately staffed 
to support that many aircraft. This thesis performs multiple analyses in optimization 
modeling to determine the minimum (“best-fit”) number of aircraft assignments for 
day-to-day operations while maintaining the requisite support for the active duty 
component. It accounts for constraints resulting from individual training and 
proficiency requirements, aircrew readiness and qualification requirements, and 
maintenance practices and capabilities. This thesis examines the development and 
application of The Orion Model (TOM), and demonstrates feasibility with an optimal 
solution of four aircraft assigned per squadron. 
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The Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (MPRF) began transitioning from 
the Lockheed Martin P-3C Orion to the Boeing P-8A Poseidon in 2013 (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 2016). 
As Active Component (AC) squadrons were pulled from their respective fleet readiness 
training plans (FRTP) to enter the six-month transition period, gaps in operational coverage 
concerning the anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW), and 
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) mission sets were identified. To maintain 
transition continuity and minimize the loss of tactical coverage overseas, the Navy 
resourced Patrol Squadrons SIX TWO and SIX NINE (the two reserve squadrons of 
MPRF) to fill those gaps in the operational deployment plan. Figure 1 shows a side-by-side 
comparison of the P-3 and P-8. 
Figure 1. P-8 Poseidon Platform Upgrade from the P-3C Orion. 
Source: Battle Machines at battle-machines.org, (2018). 
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While the reserve component continued to meet the demands of the operational 
cycle through 2017, eventually the age of the P-3 platform, the diminishing support 
infrastructure (in contrast to the expansion of the P-8 support infrastructure), and 
limitations regarding the size and part time nature of a reserve force began to have a 
negative effect on the health of assigned aircraft. In early 2018 there was a growing concern 
that the workload associated with keeping six aircraft (the required number of aircraft 
assigned to a reserve squadron) in flyable and mission ready status stressed daily 
maintenance department capacity.  
B. INTENT 
This thesis performs multiple analyses in optimization modeling to determine the 
minimum (“best-fit”) number of aircraft assignments for day-to-day operations while 
maintaining the requisite operational support for the active duty component. It draws on 
constraints from individual proficiency requirements, aircrew readiness qualifications, and 
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance practices. Naturally, unexpected events such as 
aircrew availability or repairs taking longer than scheduled risk rendering the optimal 
solution infeasible, however those concerns were mitigated with a conservative approach 
in applying the constraint values in the model. 
C. VALUE-ADDED 
Utilizing General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) software to develop an 
optimization model known as The Orion Model (TOM), the research team applied aircrew 
proficiency and readiness constraints from NATOPS General Flight and Operating 
Instructions Manual (OPNAV 3710.7) and the P-3 Wing Training Manual 
(COMPATRECONGRUINST 3500.25E). The model applied additional constraints from 
scheduled aircraft inspection cycles (found in instruction NA-01-75PAA-IMP-6-3) and 
unscheduled discrepancy maintenance efforts (data from historical 3M reports). 
Altogether, GAMS analyzed 2,641 decision variables and 1,278 constraints derived from 
these sources, and resulted in reserve capability with four aircraft. 
Two substantial benefits can be derived from this result. First, a squadron 
performed significantly more maintenance with six aircraft (53 days a month) when 
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compared to four aircraft (36 days). A reduction in the primary aircraft authorized (“PAA,” 
or the number of aircraft assigned to a squadron), would increase maintenance capacity by 
204 days annually. Additionally, a cost analysis could reveal how much money the 
DoD spends on the maintenance of two unnecessary aircraft. 
Second, the successful application of TOM would prove to be of further use in 
future aircraft procurements. Recently, the reserve component of MPRF has been 
authorized to transition to the P-8A Poseidon aircraft sometime in the early to mid-2020s. 
Table 1 shows the Average Procurement Unit Cost for a P-8A Poseidon is $197M in 
FY10$. 
Table 1. Average Procurement Unit Cost per P-8 in FY10$M. 
Source: OUSD (AT&L) (2016). 
Normalized to FY18$, that amount would be $223,157,082.90. If both reserve 
squadrons are able to accomplish their objectives with two less aircraft assigned, then the 
Department of Defense could recognize significant cost savings of approximately $892 in 
FY18$M. 
D. PREVIOUS WORKS 
While no other work directly contributes to optimization modeling being applied to 
the allocation of unit level resources, this thesis will add to a growing Department of 
Defense effort to use modeling in identifying constraints, streamlining processes, and 
reducing unnecessary spending. Two Naval Postgraduate School theses in particular 
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proved helpful in model development: Optimizing training event schedules at Naval Air 
Station Fallon (Slye, 2018) discussed the utilization of optimization modeling to schedule 
congested airspace blocks for local area F-18 training events. Optimization of USMC 
Hornet inventory (Zerr, 2016) served to employ optimization modeling in an effort to 
efficiently schedule remaining USMC F-18 Hornet service life hours as the community 
transitions to the F-35B. These theses assisted in defining the foundation upon which the 
P-3 reserve aircraft model was developed. 
E. REPORT FLOW 
The following chapter will provide a more detailed discussion on how the MPRF 
ended up in its present state. A literature review of previous works in modeling will then 
be discussed. From there, Chapter III will detail the development of TOM. Chapter IV will 
explain constraint sources, the development of the constraints, the application of 
constraints into TOM, and various scenario analyses. This thesis will end with conclusions 





A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The reserve component has always maintained a steady presence in the maritime 
patrol operational landscape. The thesis titled Comparative cost analysis of P-3 active and 
reserve aviation forces: The economics of proposed force mix alternatives summarizes 
findings in 1991’s Report on the Navy’s Total Force by providing insights in how the 
Reserve Component fit into the operational matrix. Historically, “both forces (AC and RC) 
are similarly manned, equipped, and have similar wartime missions. In most of the cases 
examined, active and reserve units were manned at, or near, full authorization levels,” 
(Wrinkle & Carson, 1991). The justification behind similar asset allocations was that a 
reserve squadron should be able to seamlessly integrate into the maritime patrol 
deployment plan causing minimal disruption in coverage. During the Cold War years, P-3 
Orion capabilities were in high demand. Conducting anti-submarine warfare missions to 
deter Russian military activity proved to be a continuous cycle; so much so that operational 
commitments had to be shared between 24 active duty squadrons and 13 reserve squadrons. 
Utilizing the reserve force was a smart decision financially as they incurred an annual cost 
of $14.6M in FY91 dollars, which was 44.5% less than active duty squadrons (Wrinkle & 
Carson, 1991). Arguments in favor for the employment of a reserve force were sound. 
While the active and reserve component of MPRF enjoyed robust employment 
through the 1980s and early 1990s (defense spending reached a then all-time high of 
$325M in 1985) (GAO, 1992), the collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in the post-Cold 
War era, and set the stage for fiscal hawkishness in the DoD:  “The United States has 
shifted its strategy from containment of the former Soviet Union to ensuring regional 
stability by focusing on strategic deterrence, overseas presence, and crisis response while 
maintaining an ability to rebuild, or reconstitute, a large force should a global threat 
reemerge” (GAO, 1992). This strategic shift served as the basis for a budgetary re-
prioritization known as Base Force: “the Base Force is considered the minimum force 
structure required to address future regional contingencies against various potential 
threats” (GAO, 1992). One of the core goals of Base Force was to reduce military spending 
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to $214M annually by 1997. Figure 2 details projected DoD budgets in an attempt to align 
appropriations with Base Force strategic objectives. In the wake of Base Force 
spending cuts, operational elements of the DoD needed to better justify budget outlays. 
Figure 2. Base Force Budget Changes. Source: GAO (1993). 
B. THE MPRF METHOD 
To mitigate the risk associated with less funding (less flight hours, less training, 
less opportunity to maintain operational readiness, etc.), the maritime patrol and 
reconnaissance force set out to justify their budget through planning to support major 
combat operations. Through numerous wartime scenario analyses, it was determined that 
an active duty P-3 Orion squadron should have twelve combat ready aircrews with nine P-
3 aircraft, and reserve squadrons were to have nine aircrews, with six aircraft, as 
promulgated by the Training & Readiness Matrix for MPRA (Commander, Patrol and 
Reconnaissance Group [CPRG], 2018). While a reserve P-3 squadron is built to 
accommodate nine aircrews, only three are required to maintain combat readiness 
qualifications (tactical NTAs as delineated on the P-3 Reserve Component Training & 
Readiness Matrix).  
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The reserve PAA of six is an extended application of a concept known as the crew 
seat ratio (CSR). It applies a constant factor to both readiness attaining, and non-readiness 
attaining aircrews, and does not consider what is required for operational preparedness and 
what isn’t. While the CSR approach to resource allocation was sound, it failed to account 
for the operational scope and limitations of the reserve force. 
C. DISADVANTAGE OF THE RESERVE FORCE 
The basis of this research was grounded in the perception that the workload 
necessary to maintain six aircraft was too much for a reserve maintenance department. The 
concern stemmed from the fact that reserve squadrons are staffed at personnel levels less 
than active duty squadrons, but were responsible for similar quantities of resources. One 
such metric of this is summarized in Table 2 comparing maintenance personnel to PAAs 
of both reserve and active duty squadrons. 




Ratio of Personnel to 
Aircraft 
Reserve Squadron ~75 6 13.1:1 
Active Squadron (P-3) ~250 9 27.8:1 
Active Squadron (P-8) ~250 7 35.7:1 
As depicted above, a reserve squadron can assign approximately 13 maintainers per 
aircraft, compared to 28 per aircraft at an active duty P-3 squadron. Also consider that 
when an active duty squadron transitions to the P-8, that ratio increases to 36:1 due to a 
lower PAA. Clearly, a reserve maintenance department is not designed to handle the 
workload associated with maintaining similar stable size to that of an active duty squadron. 
This deficit is further compounded but the part-time nature of the reserve force, meaning 
that although 75 maintainers can be assigned to a squadron, generally only 35-40 personnel 
are present on any given day.   
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D. AIRCRAFT STATUS OBSERVATIONS 
During an eight-month timeframe (November 2016 to June 2017), VP-69 
encountered four months with four aircraft, and four months with five aircraft. The 
assumption was that aircraft health was negatively impacted by a seemingly overwhelming 
amount of maintenance required to take care of six aircraft, and that aircraft status would 
improve with four aircraft. That assumption didn’t necessarily turn out to be the case. An 
Aviation Management Supply and Readiness Report (AMSRR) with the aforementioned 
date range shows that data to support the claim that too many aircraft impede readiness are 
mixed (Stephen Lovelace, unpublished data). As observed in Figure 3, there are no 
discernable conclusions that can be drawn about aircraft health as a function of PAA.   
Figure 3. Aircraft Status Compared to PAA 
A more detailed analysis of this data reveals that with an assignment of four aircraft, 
an average of 1.9 aircraft were mission capable (MC), and 2.3 aircraft were non-mission 
capable (NMC). With an assignment of five aircraft, 2.1 were MC and 2.3 were NMC. 
While NMC rates remained unchanged, MC rates improved slightly from 1.9 to 2.1 with 
five aircraft assigned. This runs counter to the assumption that less aircraft would result in 





















Regardless of the results, it was necessary to continue with TOM development to 
identify an optimal solution for aircraft assignments. This would promote the discovery of 
efficiencies in maintenance scheduling, and the potential to achieve cost savings in 
maintenance practices and future aircraft acquisitions. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
When diving into previous works done, there are multiple works on aviation with 
regards to either inventory maintenance requirements and operations or scheduling and 
operations within the Department of the Navy. There were none found that looks at all 
three aspects of operation requirements, maintenance, and inventory optimization 
specifically at the unit level.   
Scheduling maintenance activities has continued to be revisited by military 
strategist and planners. Efficiency is targeted by both the unit level and the larger wing 
level to execute mission. In Pippin (1998), a model was developed to look at UH-60 
Blackhawk battalions to manage hour allocations with readiness for helicopter battalions. 
Inputs where flight data for the Blackhawk battalion through a range of operations that the 
UH-60 historically conducted. His results showed that a measured steady interval of 
aircraft scheduled to arrive into maintenance at set times both resulted in no backlogs and 
having an ample number of helicopters available to execute their mission set. 
In similar works, Baker (2000) also looked at larger aircraft maintenance 
scheduling in that of depot level maintenance in the Navy and more specifically, the EA-
6B Prowler depot. Similar to Pippin in that their model was to ultimately avoid any backlog 
from maintenance and scheduling. This model looks to schedule monthly maintenance for 
the Prowler depot while maintaining enough aircraft in the fleet available for normal flight 
operations and missions. Baker, while using this model, found ways to efficiently schedule 
the sequencing of depot level maintenance to avoid backlogs to avoid causing issues with 
the operational Navy EA-6B force. 
Utilizing and Integer Linear Program model for managing the U.S. Naval 
Helicopter fleet, Marlow and Dell (2015) model meets minimum flight requirements 
imposed on squadrons embarked as well as ashore. These minimum flight hour 
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requirements are further broken down into monthly and annual requirements. Their output 
is the schedule in which to put individual helicopters into maintenance while continuing to 
manage the current fleet to meet current operations and flight requirements. Marlow and 
Dell prescribe from their findings, monthly flight numbers, squadrons in which to do the 
flights, schedule for depot level maintenance, and ultimate retirement of aircrafts. 
Also looking at streamlining the EA-6B depot level maintenance, Meeks (1999) 
analyzed two major functional events at the maintenance depot for the Prowler, that until 
this time, where scheduled separately. The two maintenance events were first that of the 
standard depot level maintenance requirement and second, that of a wing center section 
replacement. Utilizing an ILP to model the issue, Meeks was looking to efficiently schedule 
the depot to do one of the maintenance requirements or both in combination. With the 
ability to do both maintenance evolutions at one time, would overall reduce the down time 
an aircraft was out of the operational fleet. His model found a decrease of approximately 
50% of non-available aircraft with the prospect of bundling the two maintenance functions 
at the depot. Again, creating efficiencies and optimizing available aircraft to the fleet. 
With a slightly difference background and project on Air Force fighter squadrons, 
Gocken (2006) analyzed complex flight schedules and resulting waste from specifically 
scheduling one aircraft to one pilot. His research analyzed the options of having multiple 
aircrafts available as well as multiple pilots scheduled for varying events vice the current 
method of scheduling one aircraft with one pilot. To analyze his thesis, he developed an 
objective function that reduced pilot tasking and thus making their availability greater for 
utilization on the flight schedule. This resulted in the daily flight schedule as analyzed, to 
have more flexibility with unforeseen adjustments. 
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III. THE ORION MODEL (TOM) FORMULATION 
This chapter describes the formulation of The Orion Model (TOM), an optimization 
model designed to assist in analyzing the minimum number of aircraft required to meet 
squadron requirements. TOM is a discrete-time optimization model with the following 
input parameters: 
• Required maintenance sessions per aircraft per month 
• Time periods per maintenance session 
• Required events per Selected Reservist (SELRES) pilot 
• Required events per Full Time Support (FTS) pilot 
• Maximum number of simultaneous flight events 
• Maximum number of aircraft in maintenance simultaneously 
TOM prescribes a schedule of maintenance and flight activities that fulfills all 
aircrew proficiency and readiness requirements while satisfying constraints on aircrews, 
aircraft, and maintenance personnel. Although the output is a schedule, it is not expected 
that this schedule would be utilized in practice, due in part to the unpredictability of 
maintenance requirements. Rather, TOM’s primary purpose is to determine the feasibility 
of operating with a particular complement of aircraft under conservative maintenance 
assumptions. TOM was developed to be able to modify parameters as conditions warranted 
(the addition or subtraction of individual aircrew numbers, rescheduling of flight events, 
maintenance workloads taking longer or shorter than planned, etc.). The model was also 
designed to stress constraints under a set of given variables (i.e., with five aircraft assigned, 
how many maintenance periods would the squadron be able to perform, how many flight 
events could be accomplished, etc.). 
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A. TOM LIMITATIONS 
The following list of limitations apply to TOM, and could be considered in future 
work:  
• TOM is designed to generate a schedule for determining asset allocations. 
It is not designed to schedule flights and maintenance in practice. Because 
of the dynamic nature of a reserve squadron due to unpredictable 
personnel availability, the model output is designed to justify feasibility of 
asset allocations. 
• TOM assumes that pilots and maintenance personnel must work 
simultaneous days and schedules.   It does not account for maintenance 
personnel being able to work hours that do not interfere with flight 
schedules (i.e., midnight shift or no-fly days). 
• Due to difficulties in the collection of maintenance data, constraint inputs 
for scheduled inspections are educated estimates. Attempts to identify 
precise scheduled downtime were impeded by the limited accessibility of 
P-3 maintenance instructions and data. 
B. TOM ASSUMPTIONS 
The following list of assumptions were made and incorporated into the design of 
TOM:  
• TOM assumes all maintenance will occur within prescribed proration 
periods  
• TOM assumes that all pilots remain current on flight hours and use of the 
simulator is minimized  
• TOM assumes 30-day month for proration purposes, but only 24 are used 
for flight and maintenance requirements  
• Assumes that every SELRES pilot reports for duty every drill weekend 
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• TOM assumes all individual proficiency and aircrew readiness 
requirements are captured in the pilot flight hour constraint 
• TOM assumes an 80/20 percent split regarding local and non-local 
replacement parts. Those replacement parts have a wait period of one 
hour, and 36 hours, respectively 
• TOM assumes that 80% of maintenance work is done simultaneously, and 
that four discrepancies are being corrected at any given point in time 
C. TOM MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
 
Indices and sets:  
                        aircraft
,                       time periods









                 required number of maintenance sessions per aircraft, per month
     required time periods per maintenance session







          maximum number of aircraft in maintenance simultaneously
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               binary; =1 if pilot  is flying an event in aircraft  at time , 0 otherwise
                binary; =1 if aircraft  is in maintenance at time , 0 otherwise
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D. DISCUSSION  
TOM’s objective is to maximize the minimum number of idle time periods 
experienced by any aircraft; constraint set (1) ensures that z is equal to this value. Constraint 
set (2) ensures that each pilot flies the required number of events, while constraint set (3) 
ensures that each aircraft receives the required number of maintenance sessions. Constraint 
sets (4) ensures that each aircraft and pilot, respectively, participate in only one activity per 
time period. Constraint set (5) ensures that each pilot flies at most one event per calendar 
day. Constraint sets (6) and (7) enforce the maximum number of simultaneous flight events 
and aircraft in maintenance, respectively. Constraint set (8) ensures that all scheduled 
maintenance sessions can be completed within the planning horizon. Constraint set (9) 
declares decision variable domains. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE 
This chapter details the data sources, model implementation and performance, and 
associated sample results of The Orion Model (TOM). TOM generates a projected asset 
allocation to accomplish all required individual proficiency, aircrew readiness, scheduled 
maintenance, and unscheduled discrepancy maintenance. The intent of TOM is not to be 
used as a scheduling tool; rather it is used to decide the minimum amount of aircraft needed 
to accomplish the P-3 reserve component mission. The output of multiple TOM scenarios 
is used as confirmation. The identification of an optimal value becomes increasingly 
important when the reserve P-3 force transitions to the P-8. 
A. DATA COLLECTION AND NORMALIZATION  
Individual proficiency and aircrew readiness requirements were collected via the 
P-3 Wing Training Manual, the OPNAV 3710 series, and the VP RC Training and 
Readiness Matrix. Maintenance downtime was broken down into two components: 
scheduled inspections as required by NA-01-75PAA-IMP-6-3, and unscheduled 
maintenance as determined by sampling eight months (November 2016 to June 2017) 
worth of 3M Report data from VP-69.    
One challenge that needed to be addressed was that individual proficiency, aircrew 
readiness, and maintenance practices all had non-standard periodicities, ranging anywhere 
from monthly to 18-month requirements. Because of the variation in periodicities, pertinent 
constraint data was normalized and prorated to a 12-month requirement. 
1. Individual Proficiency Constraints 
Minimum hours required for individual aircrew proficiency (to include pilots, flight 
officers, flight engineers, acoustic operators, non-acoustic operators, and inflight 
technicians) were collected primarily from the OPNAV 3710 and the P-3 Wing Training 
Manual. A breakdown of the number of assigned aircrew by seat position and their requisite 
annual flight hours are listed in Table 3. 
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Pilots are required to attain 100 flight hours per year, 50 of which can be gained 
through training evolutions in a Level D (motion-based) simulator. A schedule relying only 
on aircraft hours would require 8.3 hours per month (100 hours in 12 months), and a 
schedule capturing only 50 hours in the plane would require 4.3 hours per month (50 hours 
in 12 months). This study uses a value of 6.5 hours of flight time per month. Since no other 
crew member would be able to allocate flight hours without pilots flying the aircraft, and 
since their requisite hours are less than the pilot requirement, their flight hours were rolled 
into the pilot constraint. 
2. Aircrew Readiness Constraints 
To identify constraints for aircrew readiness requirements, qualifications, 
periodicities, and hours per qualification were taken from the VP RC Training and 
Readiness Matrix and the P-3 Wing Training Manual. Table 4 shows a simplified 
qualification schedule of six anti-submarine (ASW), five anti-surface (ASuW), and seven 
intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance (ISR) qualifications required to be maintained by 
readiness attaining crews. The number of times that a specific qualification was to be 
conducted in an aircraft and the number of hours required per qualification were then 
calculated, and subsequently prorated.   
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A single aircrew must fly 73 hours tactically during a Fleet Readiness Training Plan 
(FRTP) to maintain readiness; thus, three aircrews require 219 flight hours. After proration, 
aircrews must allocate 12.2 hours tactically per month to maintaining readiness. This 
requirement is also captured in the pilot flight hour constraint as each flight requires a 
minimum of two pilots (although on tactical events three pilots are usually scheduled) as 
12.2 hours falls inside of 13 hours (for two pilots). 
3. Maintenance Constraints 
P-3 maintenance instruction NA-01-75PAA-IMP-6-3 and 3M reports from 
November 2016 to June 2017 serve as maintenance constraint data sources.   
Scheduled maintenance events include the 45-day inspection, the 90-day 
inspection, the 365-day inspection, the annual phase inspection, 600-hour engine and 
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propeller inspections, and a 1,200-hour inspection. Monthly prorations were calculated for 
the 45/90/365/phase inspections by taking the hours required per NA-01-75PAA-IMP-6-
3, multiplying it by the number of times that inspection will be conducted annually, and 
dividing by 12 months. The 600- and 1,200-hour inspections are conducted only when an 
engine reaches that amount of operating time. Therefore, it was not possible to capture the 
frequency, and thereby determine a proration value for those inspections. However, those 
inspections all require less than a day’s work and can be mitigated by assigning a higher 
constraint value than what is mathematically required in the model.  
To calculate the unscheduled maintenance proration value, eight months of 
historical 3M data from VP-69 were reviewed (November 2016 to June 2017). It was 
necessary to break out and analyze three complimentary components: the average number 
of man-hours performed per month, the average number of hours spent waiting on the 
arrival of replacement parts, and simultaneous maintenance work. 
The process to determine the average number of man-hours performed per month 
was straightforward. Monthly man-hour values were provided in respective 3M reports, 
and an average was taken. The resultant value was 1,130.7 man-hours. This value was 
divided by the average number of discrepancies issued per month (145.5). This resulted in 
a value of 7.8 average man-hours per discrepancy. Assuming four maintenance personnel 
were assigned to a discrepancy simultaneously, 7.8 was divided by 4 to determine the 
average individual labor-hours (i.e., hours the plane is down) per discrepancy (1.94 hours). 
Then it was necessary to calculate the time required to procure replacement parts. 
It was assumed that 80% of replacement parts could be locally sourced and obtained in a 
short time period (one hour). The remaining 20% of replacement parts must be ordered and 
shipped from non-local storage facilities, requiring an average of a day and a half (36 
hours). Thus, the average expected time to procure parts for a work order was 1 hour*0.80 
+ 36 hours*0.2 = 8.0 hours awaiting parts.  
Then 1.94 and 8.0 were summed to determine total hours per gripe the aircraft spent 
in a down status per discrepancy (9.94 hours).   
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To account for simultaneous maintenance efforts, first the average number of work 
orders per month was divided by the average number of aircraft assigned per the eight-
month period (145.5/4.5 = 32.3 work orders per aircraft per month). It was assumed that 
80% of the time, multiple work orders were being executed on an aircraft simultaneously, 
with an average of four simultaneous work orders. Thus, 80% was taken from 32.3 
(32.3*0.8=25.84 work orders per month being worked on simultaneously);  25.84 was then 
divided by 4 work orders at a time to equal 6.46. To account for the 20% of work orders 
that are worked on individually, 20% of 32.3 was taken (32.3*0.2=6.46).  6.46+6.46=12.92 
work orders per aircraft per month; 12.92 was then multiplied by 9.94 hours to get a total 
of 128.4 hours per aircraft per month.   
Summing up the scheduled and unscheduled maintenance proration amounts, an 
aircraft can be expected to be down for maintenance 8.8 days per month. Table 5 highlights 
the unscheduled maintenance methodology and Table 6 displays the proration schedule to 
determine the monthly downtime per aircraft. 
Table 5. Unscheduled Maintenance Methodology 
 
 




As depicted in Table 6, it is estimated that an aircraft will spend 8.8 days per month 
in a down status due to maintenance. The maintenance constraint in TOM was assigned a 
conservative value of 10 days. 
4. Data Setup  
A reserve squadron consists of both Full Time Support Officers (FTS) and Selective 
Reservists (SELRES). It was necessary to distinguish between the two groups since they 
have different training requirements. In identifying constraints for TOM, FTS pilots were 
designated P1-3 and SELRES pilots were designated P4-27. FTS pilots are expected to fly 
eight events per month (an average of twice a week). SELRES pilots are available for flight 
duties twice a month. This allows them to attain their requisite monthly hours over a two-
day window. Realistically, SELRES pilots are also expected to perform one day of “active 
duty time,” which would bring their monthly availability up to three days, but for the sake 
of conservatism, this element was not included in TOM. These constraints are consistent 
with training requirements as delineated per the P-3 Wing Training Manual and the 
OPNAV 3710. 
Since it is impossible for an aircrew to achieve readiness without the presence of 
tactical crew members (non-pilots), and since their flight hour requirement was superseded 
by the pilot requirement, the assumption is that the monthly flight hours to attain readiness 
has been rolled into the pilot monthly requirement as well. 
As discussed in Figure 4, the average total downtime per aircraft per month is 8.8 
days. This number has been increased in TOM to 10 days to add an additional conservative 
factor. Additionally, it was determined that no more than two planes would be flying or in 
maintenance at any given time to capture the essence of real-world scheduling in TOM. 
B. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 
For modeling purposes, a 30-day month was initially assumed. Assigning two time 
periods (day check and night check) over the course of a day, TOM initially accounted for 
60 time periods. It was soon realized this was an overestimation of a squadron’s work 
schedule. A reserve squadron operates a Monday-Friday schedule plus one drill weekend 
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a month. Therefore, six remaining weekend days (12 time periods) were removed from 
TOM. The updated model currently uses 48 time periods. 
C. SCENARIOS 
TOM was run under four separate scenarios with varying conditions to determine 
the minimum number of aircraft required to meet reserve P-3 objectives.  Each scenario 
was run in GAMS (CPLEX 12.6.3.0) using the following sample matrix of inputs shown 
in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Sample GAMS Input Data 
The four scenarios ran were: 
1.  Baseline Scenario – This scenario was run using average proficiency, 
training, and maintenance values as constraints. The goal was to determine 
what the minimum number of aircraft assigned to a squadron should be in 
order to accomplish their mission. 
2. Maintenance Intensive Scenario – Once the minimum number of planes 
required were identified, maximum maintenance values were applied to 
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stress TOM to the breaking point. Maintenance values were determined to 
be the constraint to be stressed because analyses demonstrated that the 
greatest variability in the data resided in unscheduled discrepancy work 
orders.  
3. Comparison Scenario – After identifying the minimum number of planes 
needed, a comparison was then drawn between those results and the 
current PAA requirement. Because flight hours flown would not change 
based on the number of assigned aircraft, conclusions would be drawn 
between scenario 1 and the current PAA and would be evaluated on the 
difference of maintenance days required. 
4.  One Aircraft in Phase Maintenance Scenario – A fourth scenario run to 
ensure a squadron can accomplish its mission with one aircraft in a month-
long phase inspection. Instead of prorating a 30-day inspection over 12 
months, this scenario runs constraints through an 11-month cycle, which 
effectively accounts for a month-long phase inspection. 
Table 7 highlights the changes in parameters for the given scenarios. 
Table 7. Input Data in TOMS Scenarios 
 
 
TOM took less than one second to run through 2,641 decision variables (columns), 
and 1,278 constraints (rows).  
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1. Baseline Scenario Results
In determining the optimal number of aircraft, all constraints remained the same 
while the number of aircraft assigned A decreased by one. The scenario began with A=6 
(the current PAA), and decreased by one aircraft each excursion of the model to determine 
the minimum number of aircraft needed. After each excursion, data analyses focused on 
two variables. The first was the amount of downtime observed with different values of t 
(time periods). The second was the total number of maintenance periods observed for all 
aircraft.    
A feasible solution was identified as low as A=3, but that left minimal capacity for 
rescheduled flight events, or maintenance schedule overruns. This led to the conclusion 
that A=4 was the optimal solution. It allowed for all pilot training to be achieved with more 
capacity for maintenance work. Figure 5 represents a schedule of events when four aircraft 
are assigned. 
Figure 5. Schedule of Aircraft Events when A=4 
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2. Maintenance Intensive Scenario Results
The purpose of scenario 2 was to identify the most intense maintenance requirement 
that could be accommodated with A=4 aircraft. This is accomplished by manipulating 
M_req and Mt parameters. By manipulating these parameters, a sensitivity analysis of the 
most volatile resource was run. It was determined that the optimal PAA of four aircraft can 
take on two days of extra maintenance opportunities per month (4 time periods) and 
maintain feasibility. While it does not seem like much value added, it is important to 
remember that this value is in addition to the average daily downtime of 8.8 days, which 
was conservatively allocated in TOM as a 10-day constraint. 
3. Comparison Scenario Results
After identifying the optimal number of aircraft, it was important to assess the 
projected benefit comparing the current PAA to the optimal PAA according to TOM. The 
importance of this comparison led to the identification of improved maintenance capacities, 
and significant savings in terms of repair and future acquisition costs.   
To conduct this comparison, 8.8 days of maintenance downtime was applied to both 
a PAA of six and four aircraft. Under the current PAA of six aircraft, 106 time periods (53 
days) was the required maintenance downtime for all aircraft per month.   Using TOM’s 
optimal solution of four aircraft, the number of maintenance time periods decreases to 72 
(36 days). A reduction in PAA reduces the amount of time needed to keep the aircraft in 
flyable and/or mission ready status.   
This is significant: a reduction of two aircraft in a squadron’s stable size increases 
maintenance capacity, allowing to better absorb the impact of maintenance overruns, and 
pilots and aircrews can still fly their requisite number of hours and missions. This becomes 
especially important when considering the transition of the reserve community from P-3 to 
P-8, potentially scheduled in the early to mid 2020s.   Being able to do the same mission 
while purchasing four less total aircraft (two for VP-62 and two for VP-69), could save the 
DoD approximately $892M in FY18$.        
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4. One Aircraft in Phase Maintenance Scenario Results
As demonstrated above, annual maintenance requirements were identified, 
normalized, and prorated to a monthly factor. This monthly factor provided a uniform unit 
of measurement easily accounted for in TOM.   While the prorated factor was calculated 
accurately, it did not capture the absolute unavailability of an aircraft in a 30-day phase 
inspection. This scenario was run to ensure the three remaining and available aircraft would 
be able to handle training demands while the forth underwent a phase inspection. 
While this scenario is feasible, the margin of capacity for the remaining aircraft is 
small. This risk can be mitigated by long term planning of phase inspections around periods 
of light operational requirements throughout the FRTP. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
TOM incorporated constraints derived from individual proficiency requirements, 
aircrew readiness requirements, and scheduled and unscheduled maintenance practices and 
prescribed a schedule of squadron activities that led to the identification of an optimal 
number of aircraft assignments. It was observed through multiple scenario analyses of 
optimization modeling that a reserve P-3 squadron can comfortably achieve operational 
objectives with an assignment of four aircraft.   
The initial baseline scenario was run with a PAA of six, and decreased the number 
of aircraft by one until a feasible solution was not able to be achieved. Feasibility was 
achievable as low as A=3, but no excess capacity existed at that point. Therefore, it was 
determined that A=4 struck a good balance between flight availability and maintenance 
requirements. Additional scenarios stressed constraints with A=4 and determined that two 
additional days’ worth of maintenance could be achieved while still providing requisite 
flight opportunities for aircrews to conduct training. The maintenance required for A=6 and 
A=4 were then compared. While model output data did not support an analysis of required 
maintenance time for either A=6 or A=4 scenarios, by incorporating historical observations 
in maintenance calculations, it was determined that maintenance requirements unavoidably 
increased with an higher PAA. Therefore, an analysis of input data revealed that a stable 
size of six aircraft required an additional 17 days’ worth of extra maintenance to keep 
aircraft in a flyable status. Lastly, TOM ran a scenario where one aircraft endured a 30-day 
phase inspection; essentially, three aircraft would have to prove capable of handling flight 
requirements for a 1-month period. TOM proved feasibility under these conditions, just as 
the baseline scenario demonstrated capability with A=3. However, the risk associated with 
being unable to satisfy monthly flight requirements increased. Fortunately, this risk could 
be mitigated by long-term planning for scheduled phase inspections (i.e., with four aircraft, 
a phase inspection should only need to be conducted once every three months). 
Although the data to support the hypothesis that more aircraft resulted in a higher 
maintenance burden and less “up status” aircraft proved to be inconclusive, the 
development and utilization of TOM has proven useful for several reasons. First, the 17 
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days of extra maintenance capacity made possible with a PAA of four will allow squadron 
maintenance departments to improve upon the mission capability of the aircraft (as stated 
in Chapter II, the number of mission capable aircraft averaged 1.9). Second, it is now 
possible to conduct a cost analysis to realize potential savings by not having to maintain 
two additional aircraft. Lastly, requiring VPs 62 and 69 to maintain four aircraft per 
squadron in preparation of the prospective P-8 acquisition would save the DoD 
approximately $892M (FY18$). 
Further Research 
TOM serves as a starting point for analyzing DoD business from a different point 
of view. However, there are several suggestions for further research. First, the legitimacy 
of this research would have benefitted from analysis and application of more data. Eight 
months of maintenance data provided too small of a sample size to make any real 
determination of the effect of aircraft assignments as they relate to aircraft status.   
A major hurdle during this thesis was the development of a method to capture 
unscheduled maintenance as accurately and reasonably as possible. Replacement part 
percentages and wait times and simultaneous work factors were all based off of historical 
observations. Again, a deeper analysis of maintenance data would help identify more 
realistic value to these TOM inputs, which would thereby generate more accurate proration 
rates. Furthermore, this analysis would prove helpful in determining how wait times affect 
aircraft status as P-3 supply lines are steadily downsized in favor of the growing P-8 supply 
infrastructure.  
Lastly, an aspect of the reserve component that was not integrated in TOM was the 
impact of the deployment cycle. Observing how TOM would respond to constraints when 
a certain number of aircraft and aircrew are deployed for a period of time would provide 
valuable insight in exactly how many aircraft a reserve P-3 squadron should be assigned. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV 
Additional Analysis  
The premise of this research assumed that the current PAA overwhelms the 
capacity of a maintenance department, therefore an additional analysis was run to account 
for overlap as it relates to the cycles of scheduled inspections. One primary difference in 
this model as it compares to the baseline model, is that it accounts for delays and schedule 
overruns (upwards of four days) for the scheduled inspections. This model was developed 
in GAMS with the intention of making a binary decision on whether scheduled inspections 
for all aircraft could be conducted without overlap.    
Results from Additional Analysis 
When the model for a PAA of six aircraft was run, it was shown that there were 
more flight opportunities provided to the aircrew, but it came at the cost of scheduled 
inspection overlap (Figure A.1). Specifically, over a one-year period, two or more aircraft 
would be in simultaneous inspections more than 30 times. This overlap would make it 
much more difficult for the maintenance department to take corrective action on 
unscheduled discrepancies that would inevitably arise throughout the year.   
When the model for a PAA of four aircraft was run, it was observed that it was 
possible for a maintenance department to schedule all requisite inspections without any 
overlap. As a result, maintenance capacity increases, improving the ability to take 
corrective action on unscheduled discrepancies. 
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Figure 6. Schedule of Inspections with Overlap 
Formulation for Additional Analysis 
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